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Abstract
Sixty subjects classified as high or low in social anxiety participated in a structured heterosocial interaction under conditions of either high or low social-evaluative threat. Following the interaction,
subjects were asked to recall detailed information about the interaction partner’s appearance and the
content of the conversation. Socially anxious subjects recalled less information and made more errors
in recall than nonanxious subjects. Contrary to prediction, social-evaluative threat did not affect recall. Anxious subjects also reported greater self-focused attention during the interaction. High selffocused attention was associated with superior recall for nonanxious subjects but associated with
more frequent omission errors for anxious subjects. Results support cognitive-behavioral formulations of social anxiety which propose that socially anxious individuals engage in self-focused thinking which may impair their ability to process social information.

Social anxiety is a common (Bryant & Trower, 1974; Pilkonis & Zimbardo, 1979) and potentially debilitating problem (Amies, Gelder, & Shaw, 1983; Heimberg, Dodge, & Becker,
1987). Recent research on social anxiety has focused on the cognitive aspects of socially
anxious individuals, including their self-statement patterns. For example, socially anxious
subjects report more negative (Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979) and fewer positive
(Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985) self-statements than nonanxious subjects in anticipation of meeting a person of the opposite sex. Hartman (1984) has proposed that the selfstatements of socially anxious individuals are related to four themes:
1.
2.

Thoughts of general social inadequacy.
Concerns that their anxiety will be visible to others.
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3.
4.

Fear of negative evaluation.
Preoccupation with arousal or performance.

Sarason (1975) has labeled this pattern of self-focused, negative cognitions “anxious selfpreoccupation.” Several studies suggest that socially anxious individuals are “anxiously
self-preoccupied.” For instance, they exhibit excessive processing of information related to
how they are viewed by others (Smith, Ingram, & Brehm, 1983), are excessively concerned
with whether or not others will perceive their anxiety (McEwan & Devins, 1983), and report more self-focused and fewer other-focused thoughts during social interactions than
nonanxious subjects (Hope, Heimberg, Zollo, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987).
Various theories have proposed that anxious self-preoccupation interferes with social
performance (Hartman, 1983; Heimberg et al., 1987). Hartman suggests that the socially
anxious individual’s excessive focusing on his or her own cognitive, physiological, and
behavioral processes is part of a feedback loop that distances the individual from the interaction and thus interferes with his or her ability to function adequately. Others (Buss,
1980; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Leary, 1983) have suggested that a particular type
of self-focus—the awareness of oneself as a social object, typically referred to as public selfconsciousness—is a prerequisite for the occurrence of social anxiety. Indeed, high public
self-consciousness has been associated with sensitivity to interpersonal rejection (Fenigstein, 1979) and with poorer performance in a behavioral test (Hope & Heimberg, 1988),
particularly when the individual has low expectancies for good social performance (Burgio, Merluzzi, & Pryor, 1986). Assuming a fixed capacity model of attention, any attention
focused on the self necessarily detracts from the amount of attention available to focus on
the other individual (Wine, 1971 ). Excessive self-focus should reduce an individual’s effectiveness in social interactions by preventing him or her from devoting adequate attention to the partner’s verbal and nonverbal behavior.
Only a few studies provide evidence that anxious self-preoccupation interferes with social functioning. For example, Heimberg et al. (1985) utilized Byrne’s (1971) attraction paradigm to examine socially anxious and nonanxious subjects’ evaluations of potential interaction partners. As has been repeatedly demonstrated for normal subjects, nonanxious
subjects preferred potential partners whom they believed to have backgrounds and attitudes similar to their own. However, socially anxious subjects showed no preference for
similar or dissimilar partners. In other words, they failed to perceive, recall, or utilize potentially important social information. In a recent study with high school boys, Johnson
and Glass (1989) found that less task-focused attention was associated with higher judges’
ratings of anxiety and poorer verbal skills (less elaborate responses, fewer questions, etc.)
during a heterosocial interaction. In another study, socially anxious individuals were less
able to recall the characteristics of individuals to whom they had just been introduced
(Kimble & Zehr, 1982).
Although these studies suggest that individuals high in social anxiety demonstrate deficits in processing social information, they do not explore the nature of such deficits during
extended social interactions. Subjects in the Heimberg and associates study saw only background and attitude questionnaires which they believed to have been completed by the
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potential interaction partner. Kimble and Zehr’s subjects participated only in brief introductions. Johnson and Glass used a more extensive interaction but they examined selfstatement patterns (cognitive content) rather than cognitive processes. Therefore the present study attempted to move away from self-statement analysis and examine the social
information processing abilities of socially anxious and nonanxious individuals during a
heterosocial interaction.
High and low socially anxious subjects were asked to recall information about their interaction partners following a moderately structured conversation. In order to examine
whether the amount of anxiety subjects actually experienced during the interaction would
be related to recall, the level of social-evaluative threat was also manipulated. It was predicted that socially anxious subjects would remember less information about their interaction
partner than nonanxious subjects, particularly under conditions of high social evaluation.
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that subjects who experienced the poorest recall would
report the most self-focused attention during the interaction.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 60 undergraduate women who completed the Social Avoidance and Distress
Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend, 1969) as part of a battery of questionnaires administered
during group testing sessions held at the beginning of the semester. The SADS is a commonly used measure of social anxiety (Heimberg, 1988) and was used to screen subjects
for the study. Those scoring in the upper or lower quartile were telephoned and invited to
participate in a study of “first impressions” in exchange for course credit. This procedure
yielded 30 high (M = 14.10, SD= 4.07) and 30 low (M = 1.40, SD = 1.08) socially anxious
subjects.
Procedure
Subjects arrived at the laboratory for individual appointments and were seated in a small
waiting area in which one of three male confederates was already seated. Signs requested
that study participants wait without conversing. After approximately two minutes, the
male experimenter entered the waiting area and asked both the subject and the confederate
to give their informed consent. The experimenter then escorted the subject to a small room
containing two chairs and video- and audio-recording equipment. The two chairs were
facing each other but were situated so that only one was in view of the video camera.
Prior to arrival at the laboratory, subjects had been randomly assigned to one of two
experimental conditions as a manipulation of state social anxiety. Subjects in the evaluative
condition were seated facing the video camera and told that this was a study of the impressions women make on men when they meet for the first time. Therefore, each subject
would be asked to make the best impression possible during a conversation with the man
she had seen in the waiting area. The experimenter emphasized that her performance
would be evaluated by the interaction partner and by the experimenter. The latter’s evaluation would be based on a videotape of the interaction. (The videorecorder was never
actually operative.)
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Subjects in the nonevaluative condition heard a nearly identical script. However, the confederate was to be the target of evaluation, and the study was described as examining the
impressions men make on women. Each subject was seated out of range of the camera and
instructed that she was to serve as an objective observer and evaluate the man’s ability to
make a good first impression. The experimenter assured her that she would not be evaluated in any way and would not appear on the videotape. Following either the evaluative
or nonevaluative instructions, the experimenter left the room, ostensibly to give instructions to the confederate.
Three minutes later, the experimenter and confederate returned. The experimenter
seated the confederate in the empty chair and explained that the subjects were to “get to know
one another” but that the research required that their conversation be structured. The experimenter handed out sheets listing 13 items grouped under six categories—Personal Information, Academic Information, Extracurricular Interests, Musical Preferences, Family
Background, and Other (see Table 1). The confederate and subject were instructed to take
turns providing the information in each category with the confederate speaking first. The
importance of discussing only the assigned topics was emphasized and the participants
were informed that this would be checked via audiotape. After questions were answered,
the experimenter turned on the recording equipment and left the room. He returned four
minutes later, turned off the equipment, and gave the subject the packet of questionnaires
described below. The confederate left the room with the experimenter, ostensibly to complete his questionnaires separately. Finally, the subject was debriefed. This debriefing included assurance that no video-recording had been made and careful questioning as to
whether she had suspected the interaction partner was a confederate. All subjects denied
knowledge of the deception.
Table 1. Topics Discussed during Structured Interactions
Personal Information
Name, age, hometown
Academic Information
Class year, major, residence (on- or off-campus housing and dormitory or neighborhood)
Extracurricular Interests
Campus-based clubs or teams involved with, hobbies, or free-time interests
Musical Preferences
Favorite music (type and groups)
Family Background
Number of siblings, how it was “growing up”
Other
Opinion of the university, career interests

Confederates
Three male undergraduate research assistants, blind to the specific hypotheses of the study
and subjects’ social anxiety level, served as confederates for the study. They were carefully
trained to be neutral and consistent during the conversations. During training it became
apparent that the confederates would be better able to handle unexpected questions from
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the subjects if they provided personal information rather than using a script standardized
for all three confederates. However, the confederates were coached to provide the same
amount of information, and each confederate’s personal script was standardized across
subjects. Confederates’ adherence to their scripts was periodically checked by the experimenter using audiotapes of the interactions. Confederates were counterbalanced across
conditions.
Questionnaires
Recall Questionnaire
Subjects’ recall of the interaction was assessed with a 12-item questionnaire designed specifically for this study. Ten items elicited objective information provided by the confederate ( e.g., “What is your partner’s name?”), and two items requested physically descriptive
information (“What color was your partner’s hair?” and “Describe the shirt your partner
wore”). Three topics included in the structured conversations (What it was like growing
up, opinion of college, and career interests) were not included in the recall test. Because
some items were worth more than one point (e.g., each confederate mentioned three extracurricular activities), possible scores ranged from 0 to 17.
Self-Awareness
A revised version of the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein et al., 1975) was used to
assess the extensiveness of subjects’ self-focused attention during the structured conversation. Two of the SCS subscales measure awareness of personal aspects that are either visible to others (public self-consciousness) or are internal events such as thoughts and feelings
(private self-consciousness). The third subscale assesses social anxiety. The SCS items were
rewritten to refer to the experimental situation rather than to how subjects generally felt.
For example, “I get embarrassed very easily” was changed to “I got embarrassed very easily.” One item on the public self-consciousness scale (“One of the last things I do before I
leave my house is look in the mirror”) could not be easily rewritten and was omitted. Following Buss’s (1980) suggestion that transient states of self-consciousness be labeled “selfawareness,” the subscales of the revised state version of the SCS will be referred to as the
public and private self-awareness subscales.
State Anxiety
All subjects completed an 8-item assessment of their anxiety during the interaction. The
endpoints of 5-point Likert scales were labeled with antonyms such as relaxed-tense, calmnervous, etc. The eight anxiety items were randomly interspersed with twelve filler items.
Results
All dependent measures were analyzed in 2 (high versus low social anxiety) × 2 (evaluative
versus nonevaluative condition) analyses of variance (ANOVAS).
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Manipulation Check
High SADS scorers (M = 2.77, SD = 0.95) achieved higher state anxiety scores during the
interaction than low SADS scorers (M = 2.15, SD = 0.61), F(1, 56) = 7.77, p < .05. Subjects who
were the focus of evaluation (M = 2.63, SD = 0.88) tended to report more anxiety during the
interaction than subjects who were not the focus of evaluation (M = 2.28, SD = 0.79), F(1, 56)
= 3.92, p < .053. The interaction effect did not approach significance.
The pattern of subjects’ scores on the revised SCS social anxiety subscale mirrored those of
the state anxiety measure. There was a significant main effect for anxiety classification (High
anxiety M = 13.40, SD = 5.89; Low anxiety M = 7.07, SD = 5.20), F(1, 56) = 20.50, p < .001, and
a nearly significant main effect for evaluation (Evaluative M = 11.32, SD = 6.07; Nonevaluative M = 9.07, SD = 6.58), F(1, 56) = 3.03, p < .087. The interaction effect was not significant
(p > .10).
Recall
Three measures were derived from the recall test-total number of items correctly recalled
(total recall), number of items recalled incorrectly (recall errors), and number of items omitted. Anxious subjects recalled less information (M = 10.03, SD = 2.71), F(1, 56) = 4.13, p < .05,
and made more errors (M =5.93, SD =2.38), F(1, 56) = 5.29, p < .05, than nonanxious subjects
(Total recall M = 11.30, SD = 2.28; Recall errors M = 4.77, SD = 1.61). The main effect for
evaluation was not significant for total recall or recall errors (ps > .10). The interaction effect
for total recall approached significance (p < .09). This interaction trend was due to anxious
subjects’ recall deficits in the evaluative condition.
The interaction effect of subject anxiety and evaluation was significant for the number
of omitted items, F(1, 56) = 9.47, p < .003 (see Figure 1). Duncan’s Multiple Range Tests
revealed that anxious/evaluative (M = 1.33, SD = 0.82) and nonanxious/nonevaluative (M
= 1.43, SD = 1.28) subjects both omitted more information than anxious/nonevaluative (M
= 0.73, SD = 0.88) and nonanxious/evaluative (M = 0.50, SD = 0.82) subjects who did not
differ from one another. Neither main effect was significant for omissions.

Figure 1. Mean number of items omitted on the recall task for socially anxious and nonanxious subjects under evaluative and nonevaluative conditions.
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Self-Awareness
Anxious subjects reported more private self-awareness (M = 11.20, SD = 2.76), F(1, 56) =
5.25, p < .03, and tended to report more public self-awareness (M = 15.50, SD = 4.94), F(1,
56) = 3.45, p < .068, than nonanxious subjects (Private M = 9.40, SD = 3.28; Public M = 12.93,
SD = 5.78). The main effect for evaluation and the interaction effect were not significant for
either private or public self-awareness.
Correlations between public and private self-awareness and total recall, recall errors,
and omissions were computed separately for high and low anxious subjects. As shown in
Table 2, public and private self-awareness were positively correlated with total recall and
negatively related to recall errors and omissions for low anxious subjects, suggesting that
higher levels of self-awareness facilitated recall. Most correlations were nonsignificant for
high anxious subjects. However, higher public self-awareness was related to a higher frequency of omissions for anxious subjects.
Table 2. Correlations among Public and Private Self-Awareness and Recall Measures for High
and Low Socially Anxious Subjects
Private Self-Awareness

Public Self-Awareness

High Socially Anxious Subjects (n = 30)
Total Recall

.14

–.05

Recall Errors

–.12

–.08

Omissions

–.10

.32*

Low Socially Anxious Subjects (n = 30)
Total Recall

.47**

.44**

Recall Errors

–.39*

–.33*

Omissions

–.39*

–.40*

*p < .05, **p < .01

Discussion
It was hypothesized that socially anxious subjects would demonstrate more recall deficits
than·nonanxious subjects following a heterosocial interaction. This hypothesis was largely
supported. Anxious subjects recalled less information and made more recall errors than
nonanxious subjects. However, when recall was defined in terms of the number of items
omitted, the hypothesis was not supported. Anxious subjects in the evaluative condition
and nonanxious subjects in the nonevaluative. condition both omitted more information
than anxious/nonevaluative and nonanxious/evaluative subjects. It was predicted that the
anxious/evaluative group would have high omission scores, but the poor performance of
nonanxious/nonevaluative subjects was unexpected. Examination of the data for nonanxious/nonevaluative subjects indicates that their total recall was similar to that of nonanxious/evaluative subjects. However, if they did not know the answer, they left the item
blank rather than making errors. Perhaps absence of both high-trait social anxiety and high
social-evaluative threat made these subjects more willing to admit when they could not
recall certain items.
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It was also expected that the anxious subjects’ recall deficits would be most pronounced
under conditions of high social-evaluative threat. Although there was a trend in that direction for total recall, the other two analyses (recall errors and omissions) did not support
this hypothesis. Failure to find the expected interaction between social anxiety and evaluative threat’ may be attributable to the level of anxiety subjects experienced. As noted, the
effects of the evaluation manipulation on state anxiety just missed conventional levels of
significance (p < .053). An inspection of the means for state anxiety reveals that, even in the
nonevaluative condition, socially anxious subjects reported more anxiety (M = 2.47) than
nonanxious subjects in either condition (Evaluative M = 2.22; Nonevaluative M = 2.07).
Apparently just participating in a heterosocial interaction, even one in which they were
not the focus of attention, induced anxiety for anxious subjects. Nonanxious subjects were
relatively comfortable whether or not they were to be evaluated. Interestingly, Johnson
and Glass (1989) also failed to find effects on a variety of cognitive and behavioral
measures with a similar manipulation of social evaluative threat.
As expected, high anxious subjects reported more private self-awareness and tended to
report more public self-awareness than nonanxious subjects. When the relationship between self-awareness and recall was examined separately for high and low anxious subjects, two distinct patterns emerged. For nonanxious subjects, greater public and private
self-awareness was associated with better recall. For anxious subjects only one correlation
was significant, but it showed the opposite relationship—high public self-awareness was
associated with more omissions. Thus self-awareness appears to serve a facilitative function for nonanxious subjects but a disruptive function for anxious subjects. This is only
partially supportive of the second hypothesis that recall deficits would be associated with
excessive self-focused attention. However, given the number of studies linking social anxiety
and attentional focus, the nature of the relationship between social anxiety, self-awareness,
and recall merits further investigation.
The social information-processing deficits that were associated with high social anxiety
in this study are important because of their potential to disrupt social interactions. If an
individual cannot recall specific information about an interaction partner, he or she risks
making inappropriate comments and/or may miss opportunities to further the conversation by not responding to previously communicated information. Such disruption in the
interaction would likely increase the individual’s anxiety which may, in turn, produce
more disruption and more anxiety.
There is some evidence to suggest that recall deficits like those found in the present
study are associated with disrupted social performance and anxiety. For example, socially
anxious subjects elaborate less on current and past conversation topics (Johnson & Glass,
1989) and speak less during social interactions (Conger & Farrell, 1981).
Furthermore, we have noted that social phobics in our treatment program (Heimberg,
Becker, Goldfinger, & Vermilyea, 1985; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, &
Becker, 1990) often indicate that they do not know what to say during anxiety-provoking
interactions. It may be that they do not recognize available conversation topics because of
excessive self-focus.
Taken together, these findings support cognitive models of social anxiety (Hartman,
1983; Leary, 1983) which hypothesize that the behavioral deficiencies associated with high
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social anxiety may be a byproduct of inadequate processing of social information rather
than lack of skill. For example, anxious individuals may fail to ask appropriate questions
which elaborate on a previous topic because they do not remember the topic. This is very
different from a skills deficit model which attributes failure to ask questions to inadequate
questioning skills or lack of knowledge that asking a question would facilitate the conversation. From the information-processing perspective, increasing questioning skills would
be an ineffective treatment strategy unless the individual also learned to focus more attention on the conversation and on the interaction partner.
Obviously, this does not rule out the possibility that some socially anxious individuals
have skill deficits. However, it does imply that careful assessment of both social skills and
social information-processing strategies is needed before selecting a treatment intervention.
This study demonstrated that socially anxious subjects process social information differently from nonanxious subjects during moderately structured social interaction. However, the study does not indicate whether the recall deficits found in the anxious subjects
were specific to social information in interactions or represented more general deficits.
From our work with social phobics, we hypothesize that the recall deficits occur only in
social situations which provoke anxiety, but that in those situations, all aspects of information processing (including non-social information) is disrupted. Finally, the present
study utilized only women as subjects. Although we have no reason to believe these findings would not generalize to men, this issue needs empirical examination.
Acknowledgment – Portions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the Association
for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Boston, November, 1987.
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